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FROM RAILROADS TO SAND DUNES:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE OFFSETTING
DOCTRINE IN PARTIAL TAKINGS
Louis M. Russo*
Called “shadowy at best,” the offsetting doctrine in partial takings has
confused “even trained legal minds” and generated inconsistent decision
after inconsistent decision. The offsetting doctrine allows certain benefits,
termed special, to offset condemnation awards, while general benefits may
not be offset.
Courts blindly adhere to the doctrine despite its
underpinnings rooted in eighteenth-century public policy, which was based
on concerns of overly speculative valuation and arguably erroneous
fairness, as well as incorrect interpretations of Takings Clause
jurisprudence. Such adherence dramatically increases the cost of financing
a takings project.
In the face of blind adherence to the doctrine, municipalities are forced
to balance the needs of their citizens against the needs of eighteenthcentury courts, often resulting in the failure of municipalities to engage in
takings for the public benefit. This Note argues that new public policy
concerns warrant rejection of the doctrine in favor of a rule that allows all
nonspeculative benefits to offset a condemnation award. This rule would
take into account modern advances in evidence, promote fairness, simplify
the judicial process, and allow municipalities to respond to twentiethcentury problems while landowners receive just compensation for taken
land.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine for just a moment that you are the mayor of a coastal city that
was just ravaged by the devastating effects of a major hurricane.1 Climate
scientists tell you that such storms will become more prevalent, and
although you are unsure of the science, you decide that action must be
taken.2
After consulting with scientists, engineers, and city planners, you decide
that the most prudent course of action is to build sand dunes.3 Sand dunes
are often considered a first line of defense against coastal flooding.4
Unfortunately, private landowners, who cherish their views of the usually
peaceful Atlantic, own most of the beachfront land in your city.
You consult with a city attorney, who counsels that you may use the
power of eminent domain to take a portion of the landowner’s property, so
long as you provide “just compensation.”5 Delighted, you respond that this
should not be a problem—after all, the owners will receive implicit
compensation in the form of protection from further storms, right? Maybe.
The homeowners will almost certainly argue that they must be financially
compensated—that is,monetarily—and that it is unjust to force them to bear
the costs of a project that the entire community benefits from.
Determining who is correct hinges on a body of law where “[c]onfusion
abounds.”6 That body of law, the subject of this Note, is the offsetting
doctrine in partial takings.7
This scenario bears much similarity to the facts that were before the
Supreme Court of New Jersey in Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan.8
Harvey Cedars, a municipality on Long Beach Island in New Jersey,
exercised the power of eminent domain to facilitate a dune construction
project that restored beaches, protecting residents from erosion and storms.9
1. It is estimated that Hurricane Sandy caused $19 billion worth of damage to New
York City alone. Eric S. Blake et al., Tropical Cyclone Report Hurricane Sandy, NAT’L
HURRICANE CTR. 18 (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012
_Sandy.pdf.
2. Scientists disagree about the increased likelihood of major tropical storms in the
mid-Atlantic region. Compare THOMAS C. PETERSON ET AL., EXPLAINING EXTREME EVENTS
OF 2012 FROM A CLIMATE PERSPECTIVE S20 (2013) (suggesting “increased frequency of
Sandy-like inundation disasters in the coming decades along the mid-Atlantic and
elsewhere”), with Elizabeth A. Barnes et al., Model Projections of Atmospheric Steering of
Sandy-Like Superstorms, 110 PNAS 15,211–215 (2013) (noting that “climate models
consistently project a decrease in the frequency and persistence of the westward flow that led
to Sandy’s unprecedented track”).
3. Sand dunes protected properties in New York and New Jersey from flooding during
Hurricane Sandy. See Mireya Navarro & Rachel Nuwer, Resisted for Blocking the View,
Dunes Prove They Blunt Storms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2012, at A1.
4. Sand Dunes, FEMA (Sept. 4, 2013, 5:04 AM), http://www.fema.gov/floodplainmanagement/sand-dunes.
5. For a basic discussion of the power of eminent domain, see infra Part I.A.
6. 8A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § G16.04 (Matthew Bender
3d ed. 2013).
7. Id.
8. 70 A.3d 524 (N.J. 2013).
9. Id. at 526.
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The municipality acquired an easement on the Karans’ property, but the
Karans rejected an eminent domain award issued by three appointed
commissioners and demanded a jury trial on the issue of compensation.10
At a preliminary hearing, the trial court needed to determine if the
borough could present evidence to the jury that “[w]ithout the dune project,
the Karans’ property had only a 27 [percent] chance of surviving fifty years
without any storm damage.”11 The lower court determined that the benefit
of the storm-protection project was “shared . . . by the larger community,”
or put differently, a “general benefit.”12
By classifying the benefits of the project as general, the trial court
determined that New Jersey’s “traditional offsetting doctrine”13 prohibited
the jury from reducing, or offsetting, the eminent domain award; only
special benefits could offset an award.14 Thus, Harvey Cedars was
precluded from introducing any evidence concerning the protection
provided by the sand dunes. At trial, the Karans received a jury award of
$375,000.15 Harvey Cedars appealed, and the case made its way to the
Supreme Court of New Jersey.16
On appeal, the New Jersey high court was tasked with determining “how
to calculate ‘just compensation’ when the taking of a portion of . . . property
. . . enhance[d] in part the value of the remaining property.”17 The court
could have: (1) reaffirmed the application of the traditional offsetting
doctrine, upholding the ruling of the trial court; (2) maintained the
traditional offsetting doctrine but characterized the dune project as creating
a special benefit;18 (3) eliminated offsetting entirely; or (4) allowed the
offsetting of all nonspeculative benefits—the course the court ultimately
took.19
This Note examines the merits of each of the routes that New Jersey
could have taken and other states can take regarding the calculation of just
compensation in partial takings cases. It pays particular attention to the
justifications for maintaining a distinction between general and special
benefits and the counter-justifications for permitting the offsetting of any
benefit. Part I provides an overview of the law of eminent domain in the
United States and introduces the basic concepts and justifications of the
offsetting doctrine. Part II discusses the constitutionality of offsetting.
Part III examines the conflict between states that maintain a distinction
10. Id. at 528.
11. Id. at 529.
12. Id.
13. E.H. Schopflocher, Annotation, Deduction of Benefits in Determining Compensation
or Damages in Eminent Domain, 145 A.L.R. 7, 40 (1943) (“The principal rule, for purposes
of the distinction between deductible and nondeductible benefits, is that general benefits
cannot be deducted, but that special benefits are deductible.” (footnotes omitted)).
14. See Karan, 70 A.3d at 529–30. The trial judge relied on Sullivan v. North Hudson
County Railroad Co., 18 A. 689 (N.J. 1889).
15. Karan, 70 A.3d at 531.
16. Id. at 532.
17. Id. at 526.
18. The borough argued for this approach. See id. at 532.
19. Id. at 543–44.
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between general and special benefits and states that do not. Lastly, Part IV
contends that the arguments for maintaining a distinction between general
and special benefits do not provide a persuasive justification for the
traditional offsetting doctrine.
I. THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Part I provides a broad overview of key concepts in eminent domain and
introduces the offsetting doctrine. Part I.A considers the source of eminent
domain power, the constitutional limitations on the exercise of eminent
domain power, and the authority to delegate eminent domain power.
Part I.B provides a brief overview of the condemnation process, principally
under the Uniform Eminent Domain Code. Part I.C explores the concept of
a giving and discusses how benefits are treated when an entire property is
taken. Part I.D introduces the concept of a partial taking and explores the
methods that courts use to calculate just compensation in partial takings
cases. Part I.E introduces the offsetting doctrine, defines general and
special benefits, and discusses the justifications for the offsetting doctrine.
Part I.F discusses the historical context of the offsetting doctrine. Part I.G
discusses the modern need to offset and the evidence used in contemporary
condemnation cases. Lastly, Part I.H discusses special assessment taxes in
the context of partial condemnation.
A. The Source of the Power of Eminent Domain
This section discusses the power of eminent domain. It begins by
discussing the historical roots of eminent domain, and it then analyzes
eminent domain under the federal and state constitutions. Finally, this
section examines the authority to delegate eminent domain to local
governments, public service corporations, private corporations, and
individuals.
1. Historical Roots of the Eminent Domain
As put by a leading real property treatise: “‘Eminent Domain’ is the
power of the sovereign to take private property for the public use without
the owner’s consent.”20 Some scholars have argued that the power of
eminent domain is as old as the Bible,21 and the historical record reveals at
least some power to compel an individual to relinquish his property under
Roman law.22 However, the legal framework that surrounds the modern
exercise of eminent domain in the United States is not rooted in ancient
20. 4 HERBERT T. TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY § 1252 (3d ed.
2014) (citing United States v. 0.95 Acres of Land, 994 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1993)) (emphasis
added).
21. 1 SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 1.2[1] (noting that a jurist “claimed that the earliest
known exercise of the power of eminent domain was alluded to in the Bible”).
22. For an excellent discussion of the exercise of eminent domain under Roman law, see
J. Walter Jones, Expropriation in Roman Law, 45 L.Q. REV. 512 (1929). Additionally, the
leading authority on the historical development of eminent domain is William B. Stoebuck,
A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553 (1972).
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law23 but instead finds at least some of its theoretical underpinnings in early
English law.24 William Blackstone’s conceptualization of the power of
eminent domain as the ability to “oblige the owner to alienate his
possessions for a reasonable price” still holds true today.25 Despite these
theoretical underpinnings, American eminent domain law was largely
developed in the American colonies.26 Early colonial statutes provided that
land owners were to receive “due satisfaction,” “due justification,” or “true
[v]alue].”27
2. Eminent Domain Under the Fifth Amendment
At the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, it was effectively assumed
that sovereign governments, including the federal government, maintained
the power of eminent domain.28 This power is limited by the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause, which states that property shall not “be taken
for public use, without just compensation.”29
In a recent case, Kelo v. City of New London,30 the U.S. Supreme Court
adopted a broad interpretation of the public use requirement, permitting a
taking for a “public purpose”—including privately owned economic
development.31 After Kelo, sovereigns vested with the power of eminent
domain have broad powers to take private property, at least under the
Constitution, so long as there is “sufficient indicia of meeting public
use/public purpose requirements.”32

23. Nathan Matthews, The Valuation of Property in the Roman Law, 34 HARV. L. REV.
229, 230 (1921) (noting that “[t]he law of valuation, as applied by the American and English
courts . . . has no roots in [Roman law]”).
24. See Stoebuck, supra note 22, at 554, 561–67 (discussing the influential role in the
development of eminent domain shared by the Magna Carta, English statutes, and the
writings of Lord Coke, Blackstone, and John Locke). Significantly, a number of chapters of
the Magna Carta foreshadow the modern conception of the power of eminent domain. For
example, Chapter 39 provides that “[n]o freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or
exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the
lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.” MAGNA CARTA, CH. 39 (1225).
Additionally, Chapter 28 provides that “[n]o constable or other bailiff of ours shall take corn
or other provisions from anyone without immediately tendering money therefore . . . .” Id. at
CH. 28. For a thorough discussion of the provisions of the Magna Carta that are relevant to
the power of eminent domain, see KYLE SCOTT, THE PRICE OF POLITICS: LESSONS FROM
KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON 1–17 (2010).
25. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *135.
26. See generally James W. Ely, Jr., That Due Satisfaction May Be Made: The Fifth
Amendment and the Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1992).
27. Id. at 8–11.
28. 13 RICHARD J. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79F.01 (Michael Allan Wolf,
ed., Matthew Bender 2013) (noting that the Fifth Amendment “assumes that a governmental
power to take private property exists”). Despite this assumption, the U.S. Supreme Court did
not officially recognize the power of the federal government to take property until 1875.
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
30. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
31. See id. at 484–86.
32. 2A SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 7.09[2].
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This broad conception of “public use” is tempered by the second
Just compensation,
constitutional requirement—just compensation.33
which is the primary issue under the offsetting doctrine,34 at its most
general level requires the payment of fair market value.35 The Supreme
Court has generally required that this value be determined at the “highest
and most profitable use for which the land is likely to be needed in the
reasonably near future.”36
3. Eminent Domain Under State Constitutions
In addition to the U.S. Constitution, forty-nine states have an eminent
domain provision in their state constitutions.37 Despite often using near
identical language,38 states are free to interpret their constitutions as
providing greater protection to private property.39 As a result, eminent
domain cases “brought under a state constitutional provision may require a
different analysis and lead to different results.”40 This is especially true in
the realm of partial takings and the offsetting doctrine because states
frequently disagree about the classification of benefits as general or
special.41
4. Delegation of the Power of Eminent Domain
Although the eminent domain power is originally vested in the federal
and state governments, it is unquestioned that this power can be delegated
to local governments,42 public service corporations,43 private
corporations,44 and even individuals.45 Once eminent domain power is
33. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 497 (acknowledging the second requirement of just
compensation).
34. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
35. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (noting that landowners are
entitled to fair market value).
36. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
37. 1 SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 1.3. North Carolina is the only state without an eminent
domain provision. See id.
38. For example, the Washington Constitution provides that “[p]rivate property shall not
be taken for private use . . . . No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or
private use without just compensation having been first made.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16.
39. See, e.g., Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. v. State, 13 P.3d 183, 189 (Wash. 2000)
(“Washington state courts . . . provide Washington citizens with enhanced protections
against taking private property for private use.”).
40. 1 SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 1.3.
41. Compare Blankenburg v. City of Northfield, 462 N.W.2d 417, 418 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990) (finding that a connection to a public sewer is a special benefit), with City of Wichita
v. May’s Co., 510 P.2d 184, 187–88 (Kan. 1973) (concluding that the building of a sewer
line confers no special benefit).
42. See, e.g., State v. Mayor of Newark, 23 A. 129, 129 (N.J. 1891) (noting the authority
to delegate eminent domain power to a city).
43. See, e.g., N.C. Pub. Serv. Co. v. S. Power Co., 282 F. 837, 841 (4th Cir. 1922) (“The
right of eminent domain is conferred by statute on electric power and light companies.”).
44. See, e.g., Gradison v. Ohio Oil Co., 156 N.E.2d 80, 82 (Ind. 1959) (permitting the
affirmative grant of eminent domain power to both domestic and foreign corporations).
45. See, e.g., United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 43 F. Supp. 561, 565 (E.D.N.Y.
1942) (“Congress may properly delegate to individuals . . . [the] power to condemn.”).
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granted, judicial review of the grantees’ authority is limited to whether they
complied with the public use and just compensation restrictions.46 In other
words, when the power of eminent domain is exercised by a grantee or the
state itself, the scope of judicial review does not reach questions like
whether the project is necessary or prudent.47
The delegation of eminent domain power to railroads played an
extremely important role in their development.48 Legislatures and courts
were apprehensive about granting the power of eminent domain to
railroads.49 As a result of this apprehension, eighteenth-century state
supreme courts developed a variety of protective doctrines,50including the
offsetting doctrine.51
B. Eminent Domain Explored: The Condemnation Process
Each state and the federal government have procedures to exercise the
power of eminent domain—or in other words, condemn the land.52 The
particular procedures vary “widely in different jurisdictions.”53
At a general level, when an entity desires to exercise the power of
eminent domain, there are two questions: the validity of the taking and the
calculation of just compensation.54 The apparatus to answer these questions
can be either administrative or judicial.55
The administrative approach typically consists of a vote on an ordinance
or resolution to take a certain property.56 Concurrent with this vote is an
“award . . . of compensation to each individual whose land is taken.”57 If
the landowners wish to challenge the award of compensation, they must
institute a challenge, which would be tried before a jury or judge like any
other action at common law.58
Under the judicial approach, when an entity invested with the power of
eminent domain wants to exercise that power, “it institutes a suit or
proceeding in court against the persons whose land it desires to take.”59 In
that proceeding, the judicial body will first determine if the entity has the
46. 1A SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 3.03[3][c].
47. See id.
48. CHRISTIAN WOLMAR, THE GREAT RAILROAD REVOLUTION: THE HISTORY OF TRAINS
IN AMERICA 26 (2012) (noting that eminent domain power was crucial for railroads).
49. See id. at 26–27 (noting the battles and the “uphill struggle” railroads faced in
persuading legislatures and courts to grant and uphold the power of eminent domain
executed by railroads).
50. WILLIAM A FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 81
(1995).
51. For a discussion of the role railroads played in the development of the offsetting
doctrine, see infra notes 120–26 and accompanying text.
52. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 353 (10th ed. 2014).
53. 6 SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 24.01[1].
54. Id. § 24.01[2].
55. Id. § 24.02.
56. See id. § 24.04.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. Id. § 24.05[1].
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power to condemn.60 This is ordinarily a question of law determined at a
hearing.61 If the entity is determined to have the power to condemn, a
proceeding will be held to determine the value of just compensation.62
Under either approach, judicial or administrative, once the amount of
compensation has been challenged and the parties end up in court, a jury
will likely be presented with evidence concerning the value of the property
that is the subject of the action.63 Litigation concerning the offsetting
doctrine typically arises when appealing the admissibility of particular
evidence—like testimony regarding the value of a general or special
benefit.64
C. Givings and the Treatment of Benefits During a Total Taking
When an entire property is taken, the government must compensate the
property owner for the value.65 However, the effect of any taking will
almost always benefit neighboring property owners.66 For example, if a
municipality condemns tall buildings along the shore, neighboring property
owners will receive a benefit—a view of the ocean.67 Commentators call
this benefit a giving.68 The law does not recognize givings, however, and
recipients are not “charged” for the benefits.69 In the above example, the
neighboring property owners will not have to pay the government for their
new view.70
The concept of a giving has played an important role in increased coastal
floodplain development.71 Professor Daniel D. Barnhizer argues that
government givings, including the construction of flood control measures,
have increased coastal property values.72 Professor Barnhizer argues that
public policy necessitates a change in the law that would permit the
government to offset these “givings” to finance property acquisition
programs to remove landowners from coastal areas.73

60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. For a discussion of the presentation of valuation evidence to juries, see 7 SACKMAN,
supra note 6, § G3.01–.12.
64. See, e.g., Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 544 (N.J. 2013)
(ordering a new trial because the condemning entity was “barred from presenting evidence
that is admissible”).
65. See supra notes 27–39 and accompanying text.
66. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 549–50
(2001) (discussing that givings occur “in almost every . . . government endeavor related to
property”).
67. For a similar example, in the context of rezoning ordinance, see id. at 566.
68. See id. at 550–51.
69. See id. at 564 (“Currently, givings are not a recognized category of law.”).
70. See id.
71. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of Private
Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 295 (2003).
72. See id. at 296–97.
73. See id. at 298.
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It is important to note that the recipients of these “givings” are the
property owners whose lands are not taken.74 In fact, when an entire
property is taken, the general rule is that landowners are not to be
compensated for the “effect of the proposed project upon the value of
property taken.”75 The Supreme Court has held that under the Fifth
Amendment, landowners are not entitled to receive an increased
condemnation award because of the prior likelihood that the land would be
taken.76
D. An Introduction to Partial Takings
A partial taking, in contrast with a total taking, occurs when only a
portion of land is taken or damaged by the government or entity
condemning the land.77 Partial takings cases present “far more complex
[issues] than total takings,” because the property owner “not only
experiences a loss of a portion of his or her property but also suffers
damage to the portion not taken,” and indeed can receive a benefit to his
retained land from the project undertaken on the condemned land.78
To calculate just compensation in partial takings cases, courts apply one
of two approaches—the “before and after” rule or the “severance damage”
rule.79 The before and after rule, which is used in the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions,80 “compares the fair market value of the entire
tract of land before the taking with the fair market value of the land
remaining after the taking.”81 Under the severance damage rule, the market
value of property condemned is calculated, and then additional “damages”
are calculated to determine what “the landowner is entitled to receive.”82
Each of these formulas presupposes that the remaining property will
decrease in value, but the complexities of partial takings cases arise when
courts need to determine how the remaining property may increase in value
or how the diminishment in value may be reduced as a result of the
taking.83

74. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 66, at 552 (noting that the state takes from
“Jane Smith” and gives to everyone).
75. See 4 SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 12.03.
76. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 377–78 (1943) (citing Shoemaker v.
United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893)).
77. See 4A SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 14.01.
78. See id.
79. See id.; see also Village of South Orange v. Alden Corp., 365 A.2d 469, 472 (N.J.
1976) (noting that “the compensation due the landowner may be expressed and may be
determined in either of two ways”).
80. See 4A SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 14.02[1] (“Virtually all jurisdictions allow the use
of the before and after methodology.”).
81. Id.
82. See id. § 14.02[2].
83. See Schopflocher, supra note 13, at 16.
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E. The Offsetting Doctrine and the Justifications for Its Limitations
In order to address this problem, the majority of courts follow a complex
offsetting doctrine.84 Under the majority formulation of the doctrine, “a
condemnor may offset the amount of compensation it owes a landowner by
any ‘special benefits’ to the remaining property,” but general benefits may
not offset.85
Courts have struggled to cohesively define general and special benefits.86
In fact, some courts have argued, “it is often impossible to distinguish
between [general and special benefits].”87 At least in definitional terms, a
general benefit is typically referred to as a benefit held in common with
neighboring lands.88 In contrast, special benefits are roughly defined as
benefits that “are direct and peculiar to the particular property.”89 For
example, most courts would consider the widening of a road in a large city
a general benefit, but building a highway along an isolated property would
likely be considered a special benefit.90 However, despite these definitions,
courts reach different classifications regarding near identical projects.91 For
example, faced with classifying the construction of a railroad that improved
travel, the Court of Appeals of Maryland defined the benefit as “general,”92
whereas the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reached the opposite
conclusion.93 Courts have also struggled to classify highways,94 river
channels,95 and telephone lines.96 Despite these difficulties, the offsetting

84. See 4A SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 14.03[3] (“[M]ost states allow offsets for special
benefits.”). This offsetting doctrine has some analogy to the general/special benefits
dichotomy in special assessment taxes. A special assessment is “a tax on property that
benefits in some important way from a public improvement.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
139 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “assessment”). For further discussion of the interaction
between condemnation and special assessments, see infra Part I.H.
85. 4A SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 14.03[3].
86. See Schopflocher, supra note 13, at 48–49.
87. Bramlett v. City Council of Greenville, 70 S.E. 450, 452 (S.C. 1911).
88. See, e.g., United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 416 (1926)
(defining a general benefit as “sharing in the common advantage and convenience of
increased public facilities, and the general advance in value of real estate in the vicinity by
reason thereof”); Hendler v. United States, 175 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“[B]enefits that inure to the community at large are considered general.”); see also 4A
SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 14.03[3].
89. United States v. Trout, 386 F.2d 216, 221–22 (5th Cir. 1967) (quoting United States
v. 2477.79 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in Bell Cnty., 259 F.2d 23, 28 (5th Cir.
1958)); see also 4A SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 14.03[3].
90. Deposition of Stephen J. Matonis at 32–33, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt.
Dist., No. CI-94-5673, 2006 WL 6912444 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2006), 2006 WL 6931483.
91. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
92. Lake Roland El. Ry. Co. v. Frick, 37 A. 650, 652 (Md. 1897).
93. Peabody v. Bos. Elevated Ry., 78 N.E. 392, 393 (Mass. 1906).
94. See Schopflocher, supra note 13, at 101–08.
95. See id. at 108.
96. See id.
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doctrine is followed at the federal level97 and in the overwhelming majority
of states.98
In contrast to a “giving,”99 a partial taking allows an owner to receive a
benefit from the taking: he or she owns the remaining land, which has
increased in value.100 The condemnee will receive this value if he sells the
property.101
A number of justifications exist for limiting offsetting to special
benefits.102 A significant number of courts have limited offsetting to
special benefits on a theory that “every citizen, as a taxpayer, should share
the common benefits of a government whose common burden he is required
to bear.”103 Under this line of reasoning, the owner suffers a peculiar
damage and is thereby entitled to compensation for only that peculiar
damage.104 A general benefit,105 as opposed to a special benefit, is not
peculiar to that single landowner and therefore cannot fairly reduce the
landowner’s unique harm.106 In these courts’ view, the landowner is
entitled to benefit from the taking project.107 The courts suggest that the
general benefits offered already “belong to the public, and the parties . . .
[whose land is taken] are . . . entitled to their equal share.”108
A similar line of reasoning suggests that the expense of public works
should be borne by the public.109 These courts hold that offsetting an
eminent domain award by a general benefit effectively requires the
landowner to “bear a portion of the expense of the [project].”110 If a
general benefit offsets a condemnation award, the landowner, in effect,
double pays by virtue of their payment of public taxes.111

97. See, e.g., City of Van Buren v. United States, 697 F.2d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(noting that only special and direct benefits may offset a condemnation award).
98. See 4A SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 14.03[3]; see also Schopflocher, supra note 13, at
156–293.
99. For a discussion of givings, see infra Part I.C.
100. See Paul Sinnitt, Offsetting Special Benefits and the Larger Parcel Test in Eminent
Domain, 1 GONZ. L. REV. 77, 80–81 (1966).
101. See id.
102. See Schopflocher, supra note 13, at 40.
103. Id.
104. See Hickman v. City of Kansas, 25 S.W. 225, 229 (Mo. 1894) (noting that
compensation for land damaged for the public use is limited to those “peculiar to his
property”).
105. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
106. See Hickman, 25 S.W. at 229.
107. See Meacham v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 58 Mass. (1 Cush.) 291, 297 (1849) (“The
party, whose land has been taken . . . has a right, in common with his other fellow-citizens,
to the benefit arising from the [project].”); Woodfolk v. Nashville & Chattanooga R.R. Co.,
32 Tenn. (2 Swan) 422, 436 (1852) (“[T]hese are benefits to which he is entitled with the
community in general.”); Blair v. City of Charleston, 26 S.E. 341, 345 (W. Va. 1896) (noting
landowners “pay[] taxes along with others” for general benefits).
108. City of Cincinnati v. Williams, 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint 718, 722 (C.P. 1883).
109. See Adden v. White Mountains, N.H. R.R., 55 N.H. 413, 414 (1875).
110. Id.; see also Meacham, 58 Mass. (1 Cush.) at 297 (noting the “great inequality” in
charging a landowner for the “incidental benefits” of a taking).
111. Carpenter v. Landaff, 42 N.H. 218, 221 (1860).
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An analogous argument is that by requiring a landowner to “pay” through
an offset of his condemnation award, neighboring landowners receive the
benefits of the project for free.112 A leading case suggests that allowing
such a result “would operate with great inequality.”113
A final justification, well discussed in the literature,114 is that while
arguably constitutionally permissible to offset,115 general benefits should
not be offset because they are “speculative and remote.”116 Recently,
courts have questioned this justification, arguing that such reasoning should
serve to bar any speculative benefit, but not general benefits as a class.117
F. The Historical Development of the Offsetting Doctrine
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said, “‘a page of history’ is sometimes
‘worth a volume of logic.’”118 A survey of early partial takings cases does
not necessarily reveal a clear starting point for the doctrine.119 What is
clear, however, is that courts originally did not employ any distinction
between general and special benefits.120 Additionally, the principle of
offsetting is not found in the early English laws on expropriation of
property.121
Instead, state legislatures and courts began to permit the offsetting of all
benefits in an effort to support nineteenth-century roadway and railroad
112. Keithsburg & E. R.R. Co. v. Henry, 79 Ill. 290, 294 (1875) (noting the injustice in
other landowners receiving the benefits of a project for free); see also Beveridge v. Lewis,
70 P. 1083, 1086 (Cal. 1902), overruled by L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev.
Corp., 941 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1997).
113. Meacham, 58 Mass. (1 Cush.) at 297.
114. See, e.g., Weston L. Johnson, Note, Benefits and Just Compensation in California,
20 HASTINGS L.J. 764, 766–67 (1969); P. Dexter Peacock, Note, The Offset of Benefits
Against Losses in Eminent Domain Cases in Texas: A Critical Appraisal, 44 TEX. L. REV.
1564, 1566–67 (1966).
115. For a discussion of the constitutionality of offsetting, see infra Part II.A–B. See also
infra Part IV.A–B (arguing that offsetting is constitutional).
116. Hempstead v. Salt Lake City, 90 P. 397, 401 (Utah 1907); see also Ill. State Toll
Highway Auth. v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 552 N.E.2d 1151, 1158 (Ill. 1990)
(citing Sanitary Dist. of Chi. v. Boening, 107 N.E. 810 (Ill. 1915)); Brand v. Union Elevated
R. Co., 101 N.E. 247, 250 (Ill. 1913) (characterizing special benefits as any benefit not
“conjectural or speculative”).
117. See Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d at 824 (permitting fact-finders to consider evidence
that is not conjectural or speculative); see also Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d
524, 543 (N.J. 2013) (permitting presentation on “all non-speculative, reasonably calculable
benefits”).
118. Karan, 70 A.3d at 535 (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
119. For example, neither LEWIS ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1936), nor JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN (Matthew Bender
3d ed. 2013)—both leading treatises—identify a first case that articulated the doctrine.
120. This is evident from an analysis of early eminent domain statutes. See 3 THEODORE
SEDGWICK ET AL., A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 2305 (8th ed. 1891).
121. See Senior v. Metro. Ry. Co., (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 107 (Ex.); 2 H & C 258
(rejecting the “novel” idea that compensation can be offset by benefits); see also 2 PHILLIP
NICHOLAS, NICHOLAS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 246 (Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1917) (“The
notion that, if the construction of a public improvement will effect a benefit upon adjoining
land, the owner is under an obligation to compensate the public for his good fortune has
never received favor in English eyes.”).
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development.122 One scholar referred to the practice as a “very large
involuntary private subsidy of state undertakings.”123 Indeed, railroads
made extensive use of the ability to offset and effectively paid for property
with “benefits rather than . . . cash.”124
The historical context in which this practice arose provides support for
this view. As the United States was undergoing a “wave of internal
improvements” in the early nineteenth century,125 the first opinions
considering offsetting began to appear in the state reporters.126 By the
1830s, America entered “an era of railroad enthusiasm and noisy railroad
fever.”127 Many purchased railroad-related paraphernalia as the nation
“dreamed and planned ambitious rail lines that were to cross-unsettled
territory, span rivers, and reach distant cities.”128
The early nineteenth century opinions made no effort to classify benefits
as general or special, and the New York high court went so far as to suggest
that a landowner could be entirely compensated with benefits.129 As private
companies, invested with the power of eminent domain,130 took advantage
of the ability to offset, some began to compensate landowners entirely in
benefits. One scholar reported that railroad takings in Illinois frequently
resulted in an award of $1.131 The problem became so pervasive that
California passed a constitutional amendment banning the consideration of
benefits entirely.132
As a result, courts began to develop doctrines to limit the viability of this
strategy—including the offsetting doctrine.133 In fact, it is no surprise that
the first commonly discussed case creating a distinction between general
122. Harry N. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public
Purpose in the State Courts, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 328, 363–64 (Donald Fleming &
Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971).
123. Id. at 364.
124. Johnson, supra note 114, at 766.
125. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 536 (N.J. 2013) (citing JOHN F.
STOVER, AMERICAN RAILROADS 2–8 (2d ed. 1997)).
126. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Key, 5 F. Cas. 563, 564 (C.C.D.D.C.
1829) (finding it proper to offset benefits); Commonwealth v. Coombs, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng)
489, 492 (1807) (permitting offsetting); Livingston v. City of New York, 8 Wend. 85, 85
(N.Y. 1831) (“The benefit accruing to a person whose land is taken . . . may be set off
against the loss or damage sustained by him by the taking of his property . . . .”).
127. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO UNITED STATES HISTORY 648–49 (Paul S. Boyer &
Melvyn Dubofsky eds., 2001).
128. Id. at 649.
129. See Livingston, 8 Wend. at 85 (suggesting that a benefit can equal just
compensation).
130. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
131. FISCHEL, supra note 50, at 80–84.
132. See Johnson, supra note 114, at 766. The amended constitution provides:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation having been first made to, or paid into court for, the owner, and no
right of way . . . shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation . . . other than
municipal until full compensation therefore be first made in money or ascertained
and paid into Court for the owner, irrespective of any benefits from any
improvement proposed by such corporation . . . .
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1879) (emphasis added).
133. See FISCHEL, supra note 50, at 80–84.
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and special benefits involved a taking of property by a railroad.134 Indeed,
the leading general-special benefit authorities in most states involve either
railroads or road builders as the taking entity.135 The concern of courts was
that jurors, especially in rural communities, would be overly optimistic
when estimating the benefits of new municipal projects like highways and
railroads.136
G. Offsetting in the Twenty-First Century: Needs and Evidence
This section brings the offsetting doctrine into the twenty-first century.
First, it discusses the need of modern communities to exercise the power of
eminent domain as a protective measure. Second, this section reviews the
evidentiary tools available to modern courts.
1. Needs
Modern large municipal projects often endeavor to directly benefit the
entire community.137 For example, scholars have written about the need to
employ eminent domain to help protect communities from rising seas and
coastal erosion.138 The rate of sea level rise since the turn of the
millennium is twice the average rise during the twentieth century.139 Rising
sea levels have forced homeowners to raise their houses, flooded cities, and
magnified the damage created by coastal storms.140 Any solution to these
problems is likely to incorporate some use of the power of eminent
domain.141
These concerns are present in Karan, a case concerning a joint federal
and state beach restoration project.142 The dilemma of beach erosion and
134. See Meacham v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 58 Mass. (1 Cush.) 291, 292 (1849).
135. See, e.g., Beveridge v. Lewis, 70 P. 1083, 1084 (Cal. 1902), overruled by L.A. Cnty.
Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1997); Adden v. White
Mountains, N.H. R.R., 55 N.H. 413, 414–15 (1875); State v. Hudson Cnty. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders, 25 A. 322, 323 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1892).
136. See Peacock, supra note 114, at 1567–69 (suggesting that the majority rule offsetting
only special benefits arose out of concern about overly optimistic jury estimates); see also
Johnson, supra note 114 (suggesting that California adopted the rule to address overly
speculative assessments concerning the benefit of railroads).
137. See Daniel John Granatell, Sand Dunes: Friend or Foe? 19–25 (May 1, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Seton Hall Law eRepository) (discussing general
and special benefits in the context of Sand Dunes).
138. See generally James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause:
How to Save Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279
(1998).
139. See Anny Cazenave & Gonéri Le Cozannet, Sea Level Rise and its Coastal Impacts,
1 EARTH’S FUTURE (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 6), available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/2013EF000188/pdf.
140. Wendy Koch, Rising Sea Levels Torment Norfolk, Va., and Coastal United States,
USA TODAY (Dec. 18, 2013), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story
/news/nation/2013/12/17/sea-level-rise-swamps-norfolk-us-coasts/3893825/.
141. See Titus, supra note 138, at 1388–89 (suggesting that set-backs, used in a
comprehensive shore plan, require the landowner to be compensated).
142. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524 (N.J. 2013); see supra notes 8–9
and accompanying text.
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rising seas presents coastal municipalities with three choices:
“(1) relocation, (2) construction of shore protection structures, or (3) beach
replenishment.”143 Homeowners are rarely agreeable to relocation,144 and
both shore protection structures and beach replenishment will typically
require the condemnation of some land.145 With this in mind, state
lawmakers and courts must determine how to respond to offsetting after
facing “billions of dollars of land, building, and personal damage” caused
by coastal flooding.146
To address this problem, one author argues that the federal government
should remove development from the floodplains by public acquisition of
floodplain property.147 To pay for the repurchasing programs, the author
argues that the government should offset the value of past-givings,
including beach restoration projects, federal flood insurance, and even the
construction of bridges.148 Specifically, the author proposes a “givings
recapture mechanism,” whereby an owner’s just compensation is reduced
by the value of an increase that is attributable to government action.149 In
the author’s view, just compensation only entitles the owner to receive the
value of the condemned property, excluding any givings.150 Providing any
further compensation would effectively require “the public as a whole to
subsidize . . . preferential treatment.”151
The inability of municipalities to offset the benefits of a partial taking
often results in abandonment of a beach restoration project.152 Imagine that
the cost of condemning a portion of coastal beach front to build a sand dune
is approximately $375,000 per property, without offsetting any benefits
from the project.153 Multiplying this value by “the homes that line the
coastline and the cost to municipalities would be prohibitive.”154
This problem arises in a time when the need for sand dunes and other
flood protection is at its highest.155 Numerous scholarly sources discuss
both the need and effectiveness of sea walls and sand dunes protecting
143. Granatell, supra note 137, at 3.
144. See id. at 4.
145. See id. at 14–15.
146. Id. at 8–9.
147. See Barnhizer, supra note 71, at 342.
148. See id. at 317, 325, 328.
149. See id. at 356–57.
150. See id. at 355.
151. See id. at 355 n.259 (citing Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 66, at 544).
152. See Granatell, supra note 137, at 25.
153. For a discussion of a similar hypothetical, see James Osborne, Shore Towns Near
Showdown with Dune-Building Foes, PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 3, 2012), available at
http://articles.philly.com/2012-12-03/news/35550241_1_dune-sandy-damage-barrier-islands.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Glenn Blain, Cuomo Announces $50M Project to Protect Sandy-Battered
Queens Coast from Storms, N.Y DAILY NEWS (Nov. 30, 2013), available at
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/queens/cuomo-announces-50m-project-protectqueens-storms-article-1.1533270; Jacqueline L. Urgo, Sandy-Battered Shore Town Awaits
$40 Million Seawall, PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 10, 2012), available at
http://articles.philly.com/2013-12-10/news/44993514_1_hurricane-sandy-sand-dunesseawall.
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against flooding.156 For example, civil engineering professors were able to
show that during Hurricane Sandy, the presence of a sea wall in one New
Jersey town limited damage to largely flooding homes, whereas 56 percent
of homes were destroyed in a nearby town that was not protected by a
seawall.157 Additionally, during Hurricane Sandy, some Long Island towns
were spared catastrophic damage because of the presence of fifteen-foothigh dunes, while a neighboring town that voted against building dunes
“suffered at least $200 million in property damage and infrastructure
loss.”158
Seeing the benefits of these projects, many political leaders and property
owners are hopeful that changes to partial takings law, namely permitting
general benefits to offset, will help facilitate the construction of protections
against natural hazards. New Jersey Governor Christopher Christie called
New Jersey’s rejection of the general/special benefits dichotomy “a
‘decisive victory’ for towns,” and hoped it would prompt homeowners that
were holding out to settle.159 Some have suggested that repealing the
general/special benefits dichotomy will bring fairness to partial takings
cases and allow for the construction of protections against natural
hazards.160
2. Evidence
Contemporary legal systems have expanded the evidence that is available
to prove valuation in any takings case.161 Litigants now have extensive
data available concerning the sale of the property and the price paid for
similar properties.162 Additionally, the court can often allow the jury to
conduct a physical inspection of the property called, “the View.”163 The
jury can use “the View” to evaluate “the physical characteristics of the
property, [and] the improvement constructed on the part taken.”164 In
Karan, the jury inspected the Karans’ property and home before
deliberations began.165 Presumably, if the court had allowed the jury to
156. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Irish et al., Buried Relic Seawall Mitigates Hurricane Sandy’s
Impacts, 80 COASTAL ENG’G 79, 82 (2013) (discussing the “need for multiple levels of
protection against natural hazards”); supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text (discussing the
use and effectiveness of sand dunes).
157. See Irish et al., supra note 156, at 81.
158. Navarro & Nuwer, supra note 3.
159. See MaryAnn Spoto, Supreme Court Rejects $375,000 ‘Windfall’ for Harvey Cedars
Couple Who Didn’t Want Dune Built, STAR-LEDGER (N.J.), July 9, 2013, available at
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2013/07/harvey_cedars_dunes_karans.html.
For a
discussion of New Jersey’s rejection of the general/special benefits dichotomy, see infra Part
III.C.2.
160. See Lawrence H. Shapiro & Heather L. Garleb, New Jersey Modernizes Partial
Takings Compensation, 65 PLAN. & ENVTL. 8, 11 (2013).
161. See 5 SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 18.01–.19 (discussing the use of evidence in
condemnation proceedings).
162. See id. § 18.05[4].
163. See id. § 18.08.
164. Id. § 18.08[4].
165. See Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 531 (N.J. 2013).
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consider the benefits of the sand dune project,166 the jurors could have
assessed the proximity of the house to the ocean.
Modern condemnation litigation also makes extensive use of expert
testimony.167 The modern approach is that qualified witnesses may testify
to both the damage suffered and the value of the property after the
taking.168 Expert witnesses inform the jury of their valuation of a particular
property and provide their reasoning.169 On cross examination, the expert
witness can be questioned on past appraisals of the property, past appraisals
of other properties in the area, consistency of the appraisal with past
statements, and the qualifications of the expert to testify.170 Courts also
have the option of resorting to court-appointed experts in the event that the
“adversary experts are shockingly irreconcilable.”171
H. Partial Condemnation and Special Assessments
When government entities engage in public improvements, these projects
are often financed through special assessments.172 A special assessment is
a tax on the property to pay for the benefits of a project.173 A government
entity may levy a special assessment when the local improvement is public
in nature and confers a special benefit on the property.174
Courts have nearly universally held that special assessments cannot
augment an award of severance damages when the condemnor did not seek
to offset a condemnation award.175 However, the result is different when
“the condemnor is permitted to set off against severance damages special
benefits which have accrued to the remaining land by reason of the
improvement.”176 In these cases, courts generally hold that a special
assessment may reduce any set off for special benefits.177
In City of Jackson v. Barks,178 the city of Jackson condemned a portion
of the Barks’ land to extend the city’s sewer system.179 The city argued
166. But see id. at 529–30.
167. See 5 SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 23.06–.11 (discussing the use of expert evidence in
condemnation cases).
168. See, e.g., Am. La. Pipe Line Co. v. Kennerk, 144 N.E.2d 660, 665–66 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1957).
169. See 5 SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 23.08[1] (discussing direct examination).
170. See id. § 23.08[2] (discussing cross-examination).
171. See id. § 23.11.
172. See Annotation, Eminent Domain: Consideration of Fact That Landowner’s
Remaining Land Will Be Subject to Special Assessment in Fixing Severance Damages, 59
A.L.R.3d 534, § 1[a] (1974).
173. See supra note 82; see also 89 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 2, at 421 (2006).
174. See 89 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 2, at 421 (2006).
175. See, e.g., City of Tucson v. Rickles, 505 P.2d 253, 257 (Ariz. 1973); City of Baldwin
Park v. Stoskus, 503 P.2d 1333, 1336 (Cal. 1972) (“[I]t is the general rule that ‘where a part
of a tract of land is taken for a public use, the mere fact that the remainder may thereafter be
subject to assessment does not constitute an element of damages in condemnation
proceedings.’”).
176. See Annotation, supra note 172.
177. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Rd. Comm’rs v. Vermander, 219 N.W. 74, 75–76 (Mich.
1928); City of Jackson v. Barks, 476 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
178. 476 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
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that as a result of the sewer connection, the Barks’ land was specially
benefited, increasing in value by $22,000.180
The trial court admitted evidence that the Barks had paid $7606 in
“special sewer” taxes, and the city appealed.181 The appellant court held
that it was appropriate for the trial court to consider the appreciation in
value due to the sewer project.182 The court stressed that this amount must
be the “net appreciation.”183 The city could not require the Barks “to pay
twice for the sewer line.”184 The Barks were permitted to show what they
paid for the sewer line to reduce the increased value claimed by the city.185
In a similar case involving the construction of a highway,186 the Supreme
Court of Michigan held that a special assessment must act as a credit
against any benefits considered when awarding compensation.187 The court
found that failing to credit the assessment would result in the landowner
being charged twice.188
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF OFFSETTING
Part II presents the leading authorities on the question of whether it is
constitutionally permissible to offset condemnation awards under both the
federal and state constitutions. Part II.A discusses the major challenges to
the constitutionality of offsetting under the federal Constitution. Part II.B
presents the major arguments that state courts have articulated when
holding that offsetting general benefits violates their respective
constitutions.
A. Federal Constitutional Challenges to Offsetting
As soon as legislatures and courts began offsetting, landowners brought
challenges asserting that the practice violated the Takings Clause.189
Presented in this section is an early challenge, Chesapeake & Ohio Canal
Co. v. Key,190 the most significant Supreme Court authority on the subject,
Bauman v. Ross,191 and the last Supreme Court case discussing offsetting,
United States v. Miller.192
179. See id. at 163.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 165.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 164.
185. See id. at 165.
186. See Bd. of Cnty. Rd. Comm’rs v. Vermander, 219 N.W. 74, 74–75 (Mich. 1928).
187. See id. at 76.
188. See id. at 75 (“[I]f awarded damages, less his benefits, and there is also imposed a
special assessment for benefits, which he must pay in full, then just compensation is not
awarded, for, in such case, he is twice charged with benefits.”).
189. For a discussion of the Takings Clause, see supra Part I.A.2.
190. 5 F. Cas. 563 (C.C.D.D.C. 1829); see also Scheiber, supra note 122, at 364 (noting
that Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Key was an early constitutional challenge to
offsetting).
191. 167 U.S. 548 (1897).
192. 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
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1. Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Key
In Key, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia was faced with a
constitutional challenge to a Virginia state charter that granted the
Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. the power of eminent domain.193 Pursuant
to the charter, the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. condemned F.S. Key’s
land to construct a canal along the Potomac River.194
Key claimed that the charter, which required the jury to consider the
benefits that would accrue to landowners, was unconstitutional because “no
provision [was] made for just compensation.”195 The court further noted
the position that the Takings Clause provides for “positive,
not . . . conjectural composition.”196 Under such a view, the charter would
have been unconstitutional because after considering the benefits, the jurors
might have concluded that the landowner was entitled to no
compensation.197
Instead of adopting a “positive” view of the Takings Clause, the court
reasoned that the clause adopts only a “general principle” for
compensation.198 Even if the charter had not required the jurors to consider
benefits, they would have been constitutionally free to do so.199 The
Takings Clause requires compensation to be given, not paid,200 and such
compensation should be “just in regard to the public, as well as in regard to
the individual.”201
2. Bauman v. Ross
In Bauman, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to takings
conducted by the District of Columbia.202 The commissioners of the
District of Columbia condemned a “permanent right of way for the
public.”203 The right of way was needed to create a permanent system of
highways to connect suburban subdivisions near the capital area.204 The
District of Columbia—authorized by Congress205 and bolstered by
Key206—set benefits off against the value of land taken.207
In deciding the case, the Court surveyed the decisions of a number of
state high courts including Massachusetts,208 New York,209 New Jersey,210
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Key, 5 F. Cas. at 563.
See id. at 563, 565.
Id. at 564.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id. (“[T]he constitution does not require that the value should be paid.”).
Id. (emphasis added).
Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 571 (1897).
Id. at 561.
See id.
Id. at 570.
Id. (referencing Key, 5 F. Cas. at 563).
See id.
See id. at 577 (citing Meacham v. Fitchburg R. Co., 58 Mass. (1 Cush.) 291 (1849)).
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Pennsylvania,211 and Ohio.212 Justice Gray found that most states permitted
special benefits to be set off, and that in many states, set offs for general
benefits were also permitted.213 The Court then explicitly stated, “[t]he
Constitution of the United States contains no express prohibition against
considering benefits in estimating the just compensation to be paid for
private property taken for the public use.”214 This statement, which the
Court bolstered with citations to authorities permitting offsets of both
general and special benefits,215 seemingly suggests that all offsets are
constitutionally permissible.
However, the Court also treated the exclusion of general benefits as
obvious.216 The Court excluded the consideration of general benefits on the
grounds that the landowner already paid for those benefits through
taxation.217 Despite this exclusion, the Court never said that the
consideration of general benefits would be unconstitutional nor
characterized the States that do so as violating a constitutional provision.218
The failure to characterize the state practices as unconstitutional is
especially noteworthy because in the same term the Court held that the
Takings Clause applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.219
Many federal and state courts cited Bauman for the proposition that only
special benefits could constitutionally offset an eminent domain award.220
The Supreme Court clarified the meaning of Bauman in 1918, noting that
the Court could not say if the consideration of “actual benefits” violated a
fundamental right.221 The Supreme Court of Alabama has cited McCoy for
the proposition that states have a “constitutional right . . . to permit a
deduction for general benefits.”222 This is a proposition that litigants seem
to have accepted, as none of the major cases permitting the offsetting of

209. See id. at 578 (citing Livingston v. City of New York, 8 Wend. 85 (N.Y. 1831)).
210. See id. at 592 (citing State v. Hudson Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 25 A. 322
(N.J. 1892)).
211. See id. at 579–80 (citing Watson v. Pittsburgh & Connelsville R.R. Co., 37 Pa. 469
(1861)).
212. See id. at 581 (citing Symonds v. City of Cincinnati, 14 Ohio 147 (1846) (en banc)).
213. See id. at 583–84. The Court also references JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES (1888), a preeminent treatise on American
eminent domain.
214. Bauman, 167 U.S. at 584 (emphasis added).
215. See id. (“[U]pon the authorities above stated, no such prohibition can be implied.”).
216. See id. at 581 (“We of course exclude the indirect and general benefits.”).
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See Chi. Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241
(1897).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Trout, 386 F.2d 216, 221–22 (5th Cir. 1967); Campbell v.
Bd. of Rd. Comm’rs of Davie Cnty., 92 S.E. 323, 323 (N.C. 1917).
221. McCoy v. Union Elevated R.R. Co., 247 U.S. 354, 366 (1918); see also 8A
SACKMAN, supra note 6, § G16.04 (“It is up to each state to determine the measure of ‘just
compensation’ and whether, and under what circumstances, benefits may be deducted from
an award of ‘just compensation.’”).
222. McRea v. Marion County, 133 So. 278, 279 (Ala. 1931).
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general benefits have been appealed to the Supreme Court.223 Additionally,
the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case where the Supreme
Court of North Carolina found that offsetting general benefits did not
violate either the Fifth Amendment or the North Carolina Constitution.224
3. United States v. Miller
Following Bauman, the Supreme Court did not revisit the offsetting
doctrine in detail until United States v. Miller.225 In Miller, a portion of
land was needed to construct a right of way for the Central Pacific
Railroad.226 The taking was pursuant to a federal project.227 The project
authorized land reclamation, which was required because the railways old
right of way was susceptible to flooding.228
At a jury trial to determine compensation, disputes concerning the
relevance of testimony relating to the impact of the future government
project resulted in significant litigation, which eventually made its way to
the Supreme Court.229 The Court held that “if [a] taking has in fact
benefited the remainder the benefit may be set off against the value of the
land taken.”230 Despite citing Bauman,231 the Court did not use the terms
general or special benefit in the opinion at all.232
Miller has been cited four times for the proposition that offsetting is
permissible.233 None of the courts citing Miller have suggested that
offsetting general benefits would be unconstitutional, and only two of the
courts have even noted a distinction between general and special
benefits.234

223. See, e.g., MaryAnn Spoto, Harvey Cedars Couple Receives $1 Settlement For Dune
Blocking Ocean View, STAR-LEDGER (N.J.) (Sept. 25, 2013), available at
http://www.nj.com/ocean/index.ssf/2013/09/harvey_cedars_sand_dune_dispute_settled.html
(noting that litigants settled rather than pursuing further appeal).
224. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Rowe, 549 S.E.2d 203, 209 (N.C. 2001).
225. 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
226. See id. at 370.
227. See id.
228. See id. Land reclamation is “[t]he act or an instance of improving the value of
economically useless land by physically changing the land.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1463 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “reclamation”). An example would be a project to convert a
former landfill into park land. See Allie Goolrick, Once World’s Largest Landfill, NYC’s
Freshkills Park to Add a Solar Energy Plant, WEATHER CHANNEL (Dec. 3, 2013, 1:41 PM),
http://www.weather.com/news/science/environment/freshkills-park-solar-power-20131203.
229. See Miller, 317 U.S. at 372–73.
230. See id. at 376 (citing Bauman v Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897)).
231. See id. at 376 n.21 (citing Bauman, 167 U.S. 548).
232. See id. at 369–82.
233. United States v. 4.0 Acres of Land, 175 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 1999); United
States v. 3,317.39 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Jefferson Cnty., 443 F.2d 104, 105 (8th
Cir. 1971); United States v. 901.89 Acres of Land in Davidson & Rutherford Cntys., 436
F.2d 395, 398 (6th Cir. 1970); 6816.5 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Rio Arriba Cnty. v.
United States, 411 F.2d 834, 837 (10th Cir. 1969).
234. 6816.5 Acres of Land, 411 F.2d at 837 (discussing “‘direct,’ ‘indirect,’ ‘general,’ and
‘special,’ benefits”); 901.89 Acres of Land, 436 F.2d at 398 (noting a difference between
general and special benefits).
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B. State Constitutional Challenges to Offsetting
In the beginning of the twentieth century, a number of states considered
whether offsetting general benefits would violate their own state
constitutions. For example, in Beveridge v. Lewis,235 the California
Supreme Court determined that reducing compensation for general benefits
violated the California Constitution.236 Philo Beveridge had condemned a
thirty-five-foot right of way on Mary Lewis’s land for the construction of a
Los Angeles Pacific Railway line.237 In finding that offsetting general
benefits was constitutionally impermissible, the California Supreme Court
relied largely on policy justifications.238 Specifically, the court found that
all general benefits were “conjectural, and incapable of estimation.”239 On
these grounds, the court found that it would violate the California
Constitution to force a property owner to accept “compensation in such
vague speculations.”240
Many other state courts have at one time held “that the deduction of
general benefits would violate the just compensation requirements” of their
respective state constitutions.241 These courts largely relied on the
perceived “remote, hypothetical, or speculative” nature of general benefits,
finding that such benefits did not adequately ensure the payment of “just
compensation.”242 Some states have simply followed the majority, without
any interpretation of their own state constitutions.243
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE OFFSETTING DOCTRINE
Part III discusses the current status of the offsetting doctrine at both the
federal and state levels. This part focuses on the offsetting doctrine as a
policy option rather than a constitutional question. Specifically, Part III.A
provides an overview on the particular approaches jurisdictions follow.
Part III.B presents the justifications for continuing the traditional offsetting
doctrine—particularly, the justifications offered in recent opinions
reaffirming the rule. Part III.C explores the justifications offered by
California and New Jersey for eliminating the distinction between general
and special benefits.

235. 70 P. 1083 (Cal. 1902).
236. See id. at 1084–85.
237. See id. at 1084.
238. See id. at 1085–86. For a further discussion of the policy justifications for
prohibiting the offsetting of general benefits, see supra notes 101–04 and accompanying
text.
239. Beveridge, 70 P. at 1085.
240. Id. at 1086.
241. Schopflocher, supra note 13, at 47.
242. See id.; see also Wash. Ice Co. v. City of Chicago, 35 N.E. 378, 379 (Ill. 1893)
(finding that constitutional safeguards would be of no avail if “chimerical” or imaginative
benefits could offset a condemnation award).
243. See, e.g., Daniels v. State Rd. Dep’t, 170 So. 2d 846, 853–54 (Fla. 1964) (discussing
opinions from Pennsylvania and Virginia to establish that offsetting general benefits is
impermissible).
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A. State and Federal Positions on Offsetting
The rule applied in federal courts is that only special benefits can offset a
condemnation award.244 This is a default rule, which applies regardless of
whether the governing statute defines “the nature of the benefits to be
deducted.”245 It is somewhat peculiar that federal courts have adopted this
position when it is constitutionally permissible, under the Fifth
Amendment, to offset general benefits.246 The circuit courts have largely
relied on Bauman as prohibiting the offset of general benefits at the federal
level.247
The positions of the state courts are grouped into three major categories:
one, states where benefits may not offset awards; two, states where special
benefits may offset awards, and finally, states where general and special
benefit may offset.248 The only states that do not permit any offsetting are
Iowa and Mississippi.249 Under Mississippi law, compensation for a taking
must be paid “in money.”250
The overwhelming majority of states currently permit special, but not
general, benefits to be offset.251 These states include: Alaska,252
Arizona,253 Arkansas,254 Colorado,255 Connecticut,256 Delaware,257
Florida,258 Georgia,259 Hawaii,260 Idaho,261 Indiana,262 Kansas,263
244. See, e.g., Hendler v. United States, 175 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1999); United
States v. Trout, 386 F.2d 216, 221–22 (5th Cir. 1967).
245. Schopflocher, supra note 13, at 158.
246. See supra Part II.A.
247. See, e.g., 6816.5 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Rio Arriba Cnty. v. United States,
411 F.2d 834, 837 (10th Cir. 1969) (citing Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897)).
248. A leading treatise further divides these categories along whether the offset relates to
damages to the remainder or the value of the part taken. See LEWIS ORGEL, VALUATION
UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 1000 (1936).
249. See IOWA CONST. art. I, § 18; Dykes v. State Highway Comm’n of Miss., 535 So. 2d
1349, 1351–52 (Miss. 1988) (citing Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227 (1857)).
250. Brown, 34 Miss. at 234.
251. See Schopflocher, supra note 13, at 40; see also L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v.
Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809, 825 (Cal. 1997) (noting that a minority of states permit the
offsetting of general benefits).
252. State v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 24, 27 (Alaska 1990).
253. Taylor v. State ex rel. Herman, 467 P.2d 251, 254 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970).
254. Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Welter, 471 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Ark. 1971)
(Fogleman, J., concurring) (“[W]e have clearly adopted the rule that special benefits peculiar
to the tract involved may be set off against both severance damages and the value of the land
actually taken.”).
255. Mack v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 381 P.2d 987, 990–91 (Colo. 1963).
256. Brito v. City of Waterbury, 32 A.2d 162, 163 (Conn. 1943). However, the
Connecticut Supreme Court has upheld offsetting of a benefit, without defining it as general
or special, when the improvement is not a public improvement. Tandet v. Urban
Redevelopment Comm’n, 426 A.2d 280, 288 (Conn. 1979).
257. Acierno v. State, 643 A.2d 1328, 1332 (Del. 1994) (finding that general benefits may
not be offset).
258. Daniels v. State Rd. Dep’t, 170 So. 2d 846, 853–54 (Fla. 1964).
259. Williams v. State Highway Dep’t, 185 S.E.2d 616, 617 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971).
260. Att’y Gen. v. Midkiff, 516 P.2d 1250, 1254 (Haw. 1973).
261. Tyson Creek R. Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 174 P. 1004, 1007 (Idaho 1918).
262. State v. Smith, 143 N.E.2d 666, 669 (Ind. 1957).
263. City of Wichita v. May’s Co., 510 P.2d 184, 188 (Kan. 1973).
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Kentucky,264 Louisiana,265 Maine,266 Massachusetts,267 Minnesota,268
Missouri,269 Montana,270 Nebraska,271 Nevada,272 New Hampshire,273
North Dakota,274 Ohio,275 Oklahoma,276 Oregon,277 Pennsylvania,278 Rhode
Island,279 South Carolina,280 South Dakota,281 Tennessee,282 Texas,283
Utah,284 Vermont,285 Virginia,286 Washington,287 Wisconsin,288 and
Wyoming.289
The final group of states permit offsetting of both general and special
benefits. They include: Alabama,290 Illinois,291 Maryland,292 Michigan,293
New Mexico,294 New York,295 North Carolina,296 and West Virginia.297

264. E. Ky. Rural Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Smith, 310 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Ky. 1958).
265. Dep’t of Highways v. Trippeer Realty Corp., 276 So. 2d 315, 321 (La. 1973).
266. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 23, § 154 (2010).
267. Benton v. Town of Brookline, 23 N.E. 846, 847 (Mass. 1890).
268. Mattson v. Colon, 194 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Minn. 1972).
269. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. S. Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 23–24 (Mo.
1974).
270. Gallatin Valley Electric Ry. v. Neible, 186 P. 689, 690 (Mont. 1919).
271. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cent. Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 296 N.W. 752, 754
(Neb. 1941).
272. State ex rel. Nev. Dep’t of Transp. v. Las Vegas Bldg. Materials, Inc., 761 P.2d 843,
846 (Nev. 1988).
273. Lebanon Hous. Auth. v. Nat’l Bank of Lebanon, 301 A.2d 337, 339 (N.H. 1973).
274. Lineburg v. Sandven, 21 N.W.2d 808, 812 (N.D. 1946).
275. Hilliard v. First Indus., L.P., 846 N.E.2d 559, 565 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
276. Guthrie & W. Ry. Co. v. Faulkner, 73 P. 290, 290 (Okla. 1903).
277. Dep’t of Transp. v. Montgomery Ward Dev. Corp., 719 P.2d 507, 512 (Or. Ct. App.
1986).
278. Truck Terminal Realty Co. v. Dep’t of Transp., 403 A.2d 986, 988 (Pa. 1979).
279. Capital Properties, Inc. v. State, 636 A.2d 319, 323 (R.I. 1994).
280. See Wilson v. Greenville County, 96 S.E. 301, 304 (S.C. 1918).
281. State Highway Comm’n v. Bloom, 93 N.W.2d 572, 577 (S.D. 1958).
282. Faulkner v. City of Nashville, 285 S.W. 39, 45 (Tenn. 1926).
283. Taub v. City of Deer Park, 882 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tex. 1994).
284. Hempstead v. Salt Lake City, 90 P. 397, 401 (Utah 1907).
285. Howe v. State Highway Bd., 187 A.2d 342, 345 (Vt. 1963).
286. See Shirley v. Russell, 140 S.E. 816, 822 (Va. 1927).
287. See State v. Templeman, 693 P.2d 125, 127 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
288. Renk v. State, 191 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Wis. 1971).
289. See State Highway Comm’n v. Rollins, 471 P.2d 324, 329 (Wyo. 1970) (permitting
the offset of special benefits, but not deciding if offsetting general benefits would be
permissible).
290. McRea v. Marion Cnty., 133 So. 278, 280 (Ala. 1931) (“[T]he damages to adjoining
property shall be reduced by all the benefits general and special.”).
291. In Illinois, technically only special benefits may offset, but special benefits are
defined as “[a]ny benefits to the property which enhance its market value and are not
conjectural or speculative are considered special rather than general benefits.” Ill. State Toll
Highway Auth. v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 552 N.E.2d 1151, 1158 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990).
292. Big Pool Holstein Farms, Inc. v. State Rds. Comm’n, 225 A.2d 283, 288 (Md. 1967).
293. Mich. State Highway Comm’n v. Frederick, 188 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Mich. 1971)
(noting that Michigan law makes no distinction between general and special benefits).
294. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 417 P.2d 68,
70 (N.M. 1966) (“[T]he market value of the remaining property necessarily includes any
increase in the value thereof contributed by any kind of benefits accruing to it.”).
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California298 and New Jersey299 have also recently decided to permit both
general and special benefits to offset.
B. Modern Justifications for the Traditional Offsetting Doctrine
Courts that have recently upheld the traditional offsetting doctrine have
largely relied on the same justifications as the nineteenth-century courts that
created the doctrine.300 In fact, in the majority of recent cases, mid-level
state appellate courts conclusively hold that the traditional offsetting
doctrine is the law of their state without providing justification.301
For example, in 2011, the Missouri Court of Appeals upheld an
application of the traditional offsetting doctrine.302 The City of Maryland
Heights condemned a portion of Robert Heitz’s land to construct a public
road to facilitate new real estate development opportunities.303 The city
argued that the project was a special benefit because it increased the
“accessibility, visibility, frontage, and connectivity” of the Heitz
property.304 The Missouri court noted that the “distinction between general
and special benefits has been identified as ‘shadowy at best.’”305 Despite
this characterization, the court upheld the traditional doctrine, arguing that
“to otherwise allow an offset for general benefits would effectively require
the one whose land was taken to subsidize a project that the rest of the
community received at no cost.”306
In a recent case, the Supreme Court of Texas upheld its traditional
offsetting rule.307 A Texas city condemned a portion of Henry Taub’s land
to build a drainage ditch.308 The city argued that the condemnation award
should be offset by the value of the drainage ditch, which decreased the
property’s susceptibility to flooding.309 Taub countered that the drainage
ditch was a general benefit, as the decreased flooding would be shared with
The Texas court agreed with Taub’s
the general community.310
295. Chiesa v. State, 324 N.E.2d 329, 331 (N.Y. 1974) (“Value of land taken
consequential damages to remainder minus general and special benefits = just
compensation.”).
296. Dep’t of Transp. v. Rowe, 549 S.E.2d 203, 209 (N.C. 2001) (finding that it was
constitutional for jury to consider “general benefits”).
297. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Johnson, 60 S.E.2d 203, 206–07 (W. Va. 1950)
(requiring the consideration of “all benefits”).
298. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809, 824–25 (Cal.
1997).
299. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 543 (N.J. 2013).
300. For a discussion of these justifications, see supra Part I.E.
301. See, e.g., Dep’t of Highways v. Modica, 515 So. 2d 449 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
302. See City of Md. Heights v. Heitz, 358 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).
303. See id. at 103.
304. Id. at 105.
305. Id. at 106 (citing State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n of Mo. v. Koziatek, 639
S.W.2d 86, 88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)).
306. Id.
307. See Taub v. City of Deer Park, 882 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tex. 1994).
308. See id.
309. See id.
310. See id.
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characterization, and held that general benefits could not offset a
condemnation award because a landowner should not have to pay twice for
benefits “that inure to the community at large.”311
In addition to the views of state judges, one scholar supported limiting
offsetting to special benefits because it reduces administrative costs.312 The
author acknowledges that permitting offsetting would simplify the judicial
process and promote fairness.313 However, the author contends that it
would also increase administrative costs.314 Property owners would be
“encourage[ed]” to introduce evidence on “any and all kinds of problems a
project might cause for their remainders,” resulting in increased litigation
costs.315
C. The California and New Jersey Approach
This section describes how California and New Jersey have rejected the
distinction between general and special benefits.
In California, one of the leading authorities eliminating the distinction
permitting the offsetting of both general and special benefits is the
California Supreme Court’s decision in Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority v. Continental Development Corp.316
In Continental Development, the Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (MTA) condemned a portion of land owned by
the Continental Development Corporation (Continental) to construct an
elevated light rail line called the Green Line.317 Prior to trial, the MTA
provided both evidence and expert testimony that suggested Continental’s
property would increase in value by millions of dollars because of the
Green Line project.318 The MTA noted that Continental’s property was
only a ten-minute walk from a Green Line train station.319 The MTA
offered to settle for $200,000.320
The trial court determined that the development of the transit line would
be shared “by numerous properties” and therefore excluded any evidence
concerning the benefit of the light rail project.321 The trial court stated that
“[t]he benefit of being within walking distance of a rail transit station is
merely the benefit of access. As such it confers no peculiar or unique
311. See id. at 828; see also supra notes 101–06 and accompanying text (discussing the
theory that every citizen has a right to the common benefits of government).
312. See Juliet E. Cox, Comment, Accessing the Benefits of California’s New Valuation
Rule for Partial Condemnations, 88 CAL. L. REV. 565, 600–02 (2000).
313. See id. at 600–01.
314. See id. at 601.
315. Id. However, eliminating the general/special benefit dichotomy may reduce
litigation. See infra notes 360–65 and accompanying text.
316. 941 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1997).
317. See id. at 811–12.
318. See id. at 813.
319. See id.
320. See L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 466, 469
(Ct. App. 1995), superseded by 911 P.2d 1373 (Cal. 1996), rev’d, 941 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1997).
321. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d at 812–13.
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benefit upon defendant’s property.”322 The jury awarded $1,122,149 in
damages.323 The MTA appealed, arguing that the “distinction between
general and special benefits is unworkable, produces inconsistent
results . . . , and should be abolished.”324
On appeal, the California Supreme Court described the historical
development of the offsetting doctrine.325 Specifically, the court discussed
its earlier ruling in Beveridge v. Lewis.326 The court noted the old theory
dictating that compensation must be in money, “rather than ‘conjectured
advantage.’”327 Further the court discussed lack of clarity in the Beveridge
rule—specifically, what types of benefits were to be considered, general
versus special.328
In reference to this lack of clarity, the Continental Development court
discussed how the traditional offsetting rule had proved difficult to
apply.329 A justice of a California appellate court described the distinction
as “causing ‘confusion.’”330
As California courts struggled to discover a meaningful distinction
between general and special benefits, they reached inconsistent
decisions.331 The California Supreme Court cited a case where a project
creating highway access had been found to generate special benefits in the
case of the highway and general benefits in the case of a freeway and offramp.332 The court also cited instances where lower courts had reached
inconsistent decisions regarding the classification of benefits arising from a
transit line and station.333 The court recapitulated that the cases following
Beveridge had failed to create any clear rules.334
The California Supreme Court also discussed the Beveridge court’s
concern with the “sanguine promoter”—that is, the overly optimistic project
that is never completed, an issue that was particularly acute during
nineteenth-century railroad development.335
The California court
characterized this concern as an issue of evidence rather than general versus
322. See id. at 813.
323. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469.
324. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d at 812.
325. See id. at 814–18. For a detailed discussion of the history of offsetting in California
prior to Continental Development, see Johnson, supra note 114.
326. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d at 814–818 (discussing Beveridge v. Lewis, 70 P. 1083
(Cal. 1902)). For a discussion of Beveridge, see supra notes 235–40 and accompanying text.
327. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d at 817 (quoting Beveridge, 70 P. at 1083).
328. See id. at 817–20.
329. See id. at 818.
330. Id. (quoting Gleaves, Special Benefits in Eminent Domain, Phantom of the Opera, 40
CAL. ST. B.J. 245, 249 (1965)).
331. See id.
332. See id. (citing Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. State, 449 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1969)).
333. See id. (affirming a finding of general benefits resulting from the construction of a
transit station (citing L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d
466, 470 (Ct. App. 1995))); Orpheum Bldg. Co. v. S.F. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 146
Cal. Rptr. 5, 14 (Ct. App. 1978) (affirming jury finding of special benefits resulting from the
construction of a transit station)).
334. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d at 818–19.
335. See id. at 820 (quoting Beveridge v. Lewis, 70 P. 1083, 1085 (Cal. 1902)).

2014]

THE OFFSETTING DOCTRINE IN PARTIAL TAKINGS

1567

special benefits.336 The court stated that “[t]he demands of fairness are
satisfied when compensation is determined on the basis of substantial
evidence establishing, to a reasonable certainty, the value of the property
taken and the net effect on the remainder property’s value of benefits and
detriments resulting from the project.”337 On the fairness point, the court
added that fair compensation must be just, not only to the landowner, but
also to the general public.338
Reflecting the court’s concern about uncertainty and the notion that
overly speculative benefits reflected an evidentiary concern present not only
for general benefits, but for all valuation issues,339 the court overturned the
traditional offsetting rule and announced a rule “permitting offset [of] all
reasonably certain, immediate, and nonspeculative benefits.”340 In
California, so long as a benefit is not conjectural or speculative, as proven
by evidence, it may offset a condemnation award.341
The New Jersey Supreme Court also rejected the distinction between
general and special benefits in Karan342 approaching the question much
like the California Supreme Court.343
The court began by discussing the early justifications for adopting the
“special/general benefits dichotomy” in New Jersey.344 First, previous New
Jersey cases had suggested that offsetting for general benefits would force a
property owner to “contribute more for the public and common benefit than
his neighbor,”345 a double payment argument.346 Early New Jersey cases
also expressed a concern that general benefits were speculative and could
lead to the legislature substituting “an imaginary benefit for . . . just
compensation.”347 Placing this concern in context, the court discussed the
historical period when courts created the offsetting doctrine, the period of
time when “the laying of tracks for railroads [] stitched together far-flung
communities and states into a nation during the nineteenth century.”348 The

336. See id.
337. Id.
338. See id. at 823 (citing United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121,
123 (1950)).
339. See supra notes 335–38 and accompanying text.
340. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d at 824.
341. See id.
342. For a discussion of the procedural history and facts of Harvey Cedars, see supra
notes 8–19 and accompanying text.
343. See supra Part III.C.
344. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 535 (N.J. 2013). For a more
detailed discussion of the original justifications for the traditional offsetting doctrine, see
supra Part I.E.
345. Karan, 70 A.3d at 535 (quoting State v. Miller, 23 N.J.L. 383, 385 (1852)).
346. See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
347. Karan, 70 A.3d at 535 (quoting Carson v. Coleman, 11 N.J. Eq. 106, 108 (Ch.
1856)).
348. Id. at 536 (citing STOVER, supra note 125).
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New Jersey court found that the concern over general benefits was
generated by the speculative valuations of nineteenth-century railroads.349
The court then discussed the difficulties of distinguishing between
general and special benefits.350 The court criticized the inconsistent rules
that had developed to define a benefit as special or general.351 The court
specifically noted that some New Jersey cases defined general benefits as
“speculative or conjectural,”352 while other cases used “benefits shared in
common” with the community as a definition.353 The court found that “the
terms special and general benefits do more to obscure than illuminate the
basic principles governing the computation of just compensation in eminent
domain cases.”354
The New Jersey court then proceeded to compare a total taking to a
partial taking.355 In the total taking context, courts compute compensation
by considering anything that a buyer and seller would assess when
purchasing a property.356 The court opined that buyers and sellers would
not consider benefits that were “speculative or conjectural and that are not
projected into the indefinite future.”357 Thus, in total-takings cases, courts
play a gatekeeping role, ensuring that the jury does not hear speculative
evidence.358 The court found that partial takings cases should be treated no
differently.359 Thus, in New Jersey, any “reasonably calculable benefits,”
those benefits that are not “speculative or conjectural,” can be considered
when offsetting severance damages.360 It is irrelevant whether the benefit is
peculiar to the particular property or enjoyed by the community as a
whole.361
Some public figures and attorneys hope that the new rule in New Jersey
will reduce litigation.362 The general theory is that the existence of eminent
domain should result in bargaining, and that eminent domain is rarely
used.363 Because the landowners are aware that the entity has the power of
eminent domain, they are incentivized to negotiate for a fair price rather

349. Id. (citing FISCHEL, supra note 50, at 80–81). For a discussion of the impact of
railroads on the development of the offsetting doctrine, see supra notes 119–36 and
accompanying text.
350. See id. at 539–40.
351. See id.
352. Id. at 540 (citing Mangles v. Hudson Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 25 A. 322,
323–24 (N.J. 1892)).
353. Id. (citing N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Herrontown Woods, Inc., 367 A.2d 893, 896–97 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)).
354. See id.
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. Id.
358. See id.
359. See id.
360. Id. at 543.
361. See id.
362. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
363. See Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and
Taking, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 160, 171 (2007).
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than hold out for a windfall profit.364 Along the New Jersey coastline,
many residents elected to hold out despite eminent domain, believing that
they could receive more compensation at trial.365 This belief was fueled by
the strong possibility that the benefits of the sand dune would be deemed
general, and thus would not offset a condemnation award.366 However, by
permitting offsetting, it is more likely that property owners will settle
before any litigation occurs.367
IV. A MODERN APPROACH:
OFFSETTING ALL REASONABLY CERTAIN BENEFITS
Part IV argues that both federal and state courts should offset benefits
against condemnation awards regardless of arbitrary classifications.
Part IV.A maintains that the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment permits
the offsetting of general benefits against condemnation awards. Part IV.B
asserts that most state constitutions would similarly permit offsetting of
general benefits. Part IV.C argues that the old justifications for offsetting
are outmoded. Part IV.D contends the distinction between general and
special benefits introduces unneeded complexity. Lastly, Part IV.E
discusses the public policy need for a new offsetting test in partial takings
cases.
A. The Takings Clause Does Not Prohibit Offsetting of General Benefits
From the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Bauman and Miller,368 it is
fairly clear that while federal law presumes that only special benefits will
offset,369 it is constitutionally permissible to offset any benefit.370
Bauman does not hold that offsetting general benefits is
unconstitutional.371 Instead, the case articulates that it is constitutionally

364. See id. at 169–71. But see id. at 164–69 (discussing the behavior of landowners
when there is no threat of the use of eminent domain).
365. See Kate Zernikie, Trying to Shame Dune Holdouts at Jersey Shore, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 2013, at A1 (discussing the 1000 holdouts who have refused dune construction on
their property); see also Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 528 (N.J. 2013)
(discussing the Karans’ decision to go to trial).
366. See supra Part I.E (discussing the traditional offsetting doctrine).
367. See Spoto, supra note 223; see also Christine Clolinger, NJ Court’s Holding Could
Facilitate Shoreline Sand Dune Construction, 12 SANDBAR 10, 12 (2013) (“The government
will likely no longer need to bring landowners to court to secure easements for sand dune
construction.”).
368. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1942); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897).
369. See supra notes 200–19 and accompanying text (discussing Bauman); supra notes
220–24, 242–47 (discussing the current federal approach to offsetting and other court’s
interpretations of Bauman).
370. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the Miller opinion’s assertion that any benefit may
offset and the subsequent treatment of that assertion by the circuit courts); see also McCoy v.
Union Elevated R.R. Co., 247 U.S. 354, 366 (1918) (leaving whether to offset benefits to the
states).
371. See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text (discussing the only sections of the
Bauman opinion that even suggest that offsetting general benefits might be unconstitutional).
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permissible to offset any benefit.372 The passages of the Bauman opinion
that criticize the offsetting of general benefits373 merely assert policy
reasons why jurisdictions might consider limited offsetting to special
While opining that general benefits should not be
benefits.374
considered,375 the court tacitly approves of offsetting general benefits by
citing to authorities that approved of that practice.376
As the Alabama Supreme Court has suggested,377 the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that decisions regarding offsetting are left for the individual
states to decide.378 This proposition appears tempered only by the proviso
that the benefit must not be overly speculative, be it general or special.379
In the Supreme Court’s last exposition on offsetting, the only limitation the
Court placed on offsetting was that the taking had to have “in fact benefited
the remainder.”380 The Court did not limit offsetting to special benefits, let
alone discuss the special/general benefit dichotomy.381
B. State Constitutions Do Not Prohibit Offsetting of General Benefits
Initially, if the United States Constitution did not prohibit offsetting it
would follow that state constitutions must also not impose such a
limitations. The state constitutional provisions often mirror the identical
language used in the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause.382 However,
states have a sovereign right to interpret their constitutions to provide
greater protection of private property.383 As is always the case, the U.S.
Constitution is a floor, not a ceiling.384
Despite this notion of federalism, nothing in the state constitutions or the
historical context for the ratification of the state constitutions supports a
372. See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text (discussing Bauman’s holding that
offsetting is constitutionally permissible and the authorities the Court relied on to reach that
conclusion).
373. See supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 220–21 and accompanying text (noting that Bauman relies on
authorities that permitted the offsetting of general benefits, and never, itself, holds that the
offsetting of general benefits violates the federal Constitution).
375. See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 581 (1897).
376. See supra notes 208–13 (noting the acknowledgement and citation to cases that
permitted the offsetting of general benefits).
377. See supra note 222–24 and accompanying text (discussing the Alabama Supreme
Court’s assertion that the U.S. Supreme Court has found that the states may offset general
benefits).
378. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (discussing the assertion that it would not
decide if offsetting “actual” benefits violated the Constitution).
379. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (referencing McCoy’s discussion that an
“actual” benefit must refer to a real, as opposed to speculative, benefit).
380. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 (1943); see also supra note 230 and
accompanying text (quoting Miller).
381. See supra notes 229–30 (discussing Miller and its omission of the terms general and
special benefit).
382. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text (discussing the language of state
constitutional takings provisions).
383. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
384. See generally William F. Swindler, Minimum Standards of Constitutional Justice:
Federal Floor and State Ceiling, 49 MO. L. REV 1 (1984).
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finding that offsetting general benefits is unconstitutional.385 Instead, state
courts that have determined that offsetting general benefits violates their
state constitution, are actually misinterpreting their constitutions because of
public policy concerns.386 States’ opinions on the subject always discuss
fears of permitting the offsetting of remote, hypothetical, speculative,
conjectural, or chimerical benefits.387 In fact, many state courts merely cite
to sister state authorities for the proposition that only special benefits may
offset a condemnation award.388
The takeaway from the lack of a textual justification and reliance on
policy concerns is that if states’ concerns about the speculative nature of
general benefits were assuaged, no further justification would exist for
prohibiting the offsetting of such benefits.389
C. The Justifications of the Traditional Offsetting Rule Are Outmoded
1. The Primary Role of Takings Is No Longer
to Provide Land to Private Companies
State courts’ concerns about general benefits being largely speculative
reflect concerns of the nineteenth century.390 When the traditional
offsetting doctrine was created, state courts may have been justifiably
concerned about the speculative value of the projects of the industrial
railroads.391 In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, takings were a
powerful tool of private companies in desperate need of public subsidies for
expansive development projects.392 It is clear that there were instances of
abuse, including speculative valuations that allowed railroads to take land
for free.393
However, modern takings are largely conducted by government entities
to facilitate large public projects.394 Takings no longer play the role of a
385. Such an assertion could not be true, because the text of the constitutional provisions
and the historical context of ratification are generally identical to the Fifth Amendment. See
supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 238–42 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 238–42 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of the
original justifications for the traditional offsetting doctrine, see supra Part I.E.
388. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
389. The only exception to this argument would be a state that does not permit offsetting
at all on a notion of fundamental unfairness. The only states that do not permit some kind of
offsetting are Iowa and Mississippi. See supra notes 249–50 and accompanying text.
390. See Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 540 (N.J. 2013) (declining to
“pay slavish homage to labels that have outlived their usefulness”).
391. For a discussion of the historical context that the offsetting doctrine was created in,
see supra Part I.F.
392. See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text.
393. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
394. See supra Part III.C (discussing the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the
traditional offsetting doctrine in the context of a project designed to extend a public subway
line); supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the New Jersey Supreme Court’s rejection of the
traditional offsetting doctrine in the context of a joint state-federal project to protect against
large-scale flooding); see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28–31 (1954) (discussing a
District of Columbia takings program aimed at addressing urban blight in the capital area).
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private subsidy supporting the projects of private companies who lobbied
government officials aggressively for the right to use the power of eminent
domain.395 Instead, the government conducts most takings and is
accountable to the electorate.
2. Concern over the Speculative Nature
of General Benefits Is Unwarranted
The chief concern of courts that reject offsetting of general benefits is
that the benefits are overly speculative.396 The problem with this argument
is that it does not speak to general benefits at all but instead relates to a
concern about the evidentiary standards required to prove valuation.397
There is no support for the claim that general benefits are any more
speculative than special benefits.398 Some state courts have recognized this,
and they have redefined a general benefit to merely serve as a prohibition
against “speculative” or “conjectural” benefits.399 A better solution is to
simply permit the offsetting of any benefit,400 so long as its value can be
substantially proven.401
There is little reason to worry that courts and litigants will not be able to
arrive at nonspeculative valuations of the benefit of takings projects. First,
litigants have access to a plethora of data regarding the value of properties
in their area,402 and litigants could almost certainly find data on the value of
similar properties that have benefited from a similar project. Additionally,
juries no longer deal in abstract properties and abstract projects.
Frequently, juries are permitted to physically inspect a property, which can
allow them to better understand the property in relation to the takings
project.403 For example, if Town A wanted to take a portion of B’s
oceanfront mansion, the jury could visit the mansion to observe the height
and structure of the home as well as its proximity to the ocean.404 This
would provide clarity by allowing the jury to evaluate any expert testimony
offered on valuation.
The availability of expert testimony in condemnation cases greatly
reduces the risk of a speculative benefit offsetting a condemnation
395. See generally WOLMAR, supra note 48.
396. See supra notes 114–17, 136, 240, 291, 339–41 and accompanying text (discussing
courts’ concern about the speculative nature of general benefits).
397. See supra notes 355–56 (discussing the New Jersey Supreme Court’s opinion of the
speculative nature of general benefits and the gatekeeping role played by judges).
398. See supra notes 336–37 and accompanying text (discussing the California Supreme
Court’s discussion that the fear of conjecture relates to evidence, not general or special
benefits).
399. See supra note 291 (discussing the Illinois Supreme Court’s definition of a special
versus general benefit).
400. This is permitted by Bauman, McCoy, and Miller. See supra Part II.A.
401. See supra notes 339–41, 360–61 and accompanying text (discussing the rules in
California and New Jersey, which permit the offsetting of any benefits that are not overly
speculative).
402. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.
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award.405 Litigants and courts have access to experts that can testify both to
the value before the taking, and the value of the property after the taking
project is completed.406 Judges and juries are not bound to simply accept
the direct testimony of an expert either. Experts are subject to cross
examination, and if the court is not satisfied with any expert opinion, it
could appoint its own additional expert.407
Under the rule proposed in this Note, the judge performs their traditional
“gatekeeping” role throughout the litigation.408 The judge will only allow
the jury to hear evidence that is sufficiently nonspeculative.409 In the event
that a judge determines that all of the evidence offered concerning the
benefits of a taking project is speculative, the jury will determine a
condemnation award without considering the benefit.
This allows
municipalities to offset any sufficiently proven benefits flowing from the
taking and addresses the concerns of courts that general benefits are overly
speculative.410
3. Double Payment Can Be Avoided by Reducing Offsets
to Account for Taxation
In addition to speculation, many courts root their distinction between
general and special benefits in a theory that because a landowner’s
condemnation award is offset by the benefits from the project and the
landowner pays for the project in taxes, the landowner in effect double
pays.411
A landowner is entitled to just compensation and therefore cannot be
required to pay for the gross value of an improvement.412 What this
dictates is not that general benefits cannot offset a condemnation award, but
that a landowner cannot be required to pay for the cost to produce the
improvement.413 Courts that have suggested that offsetting general benefits
results in double taxation can remedy this concern by further offsetting the
condemnation award to account for assessments paid by landowners for the
improvement.
D. Eliminating the Distinction Between General and Special Benefits
Will Simplify the Judicial Process
If courts eliminate the distinction between general and special benefits,
they can focus on ensuring that the taking entity provides sufficient proof of
the value of the offsetting benefit, rather than attempting to classify and
offset based on indeterminate categories. In fact, many cases may not even
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.

See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.
See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.
See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.E.
See supra Part I.E.
See supra notes 182–88, 337 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 184, 188 and accompanying text.
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reach the judiciary. With a clear rule in place, many litigants reach
settlements without needing to come to court.414
Since the advent of the traditional offsetting doctrine, courts have
experienced great confusion in determining whether benefits are general or
special.415 The doctrine generated so much confusion that a Missouri state
court noted that “trained legal minds have difficulty in distinguishing
between the two types of benefits.”416 A Missouri court also described the
distinction as “shadowy.”417 Naturally flowing from this confusion was
pages of inconsistent decisions in state and federal reporters.418 Courts
reached different decisions regarding the benefits flowing from railroads,
highways, river channels, and telephone lines.419
All of this confusion only served to obscure the central goal—just
compensation.420 By eliminating the distinction, courts can focus on
evaluating the evidence and ensuring that compensation is just, both to the
landowner and the public.421
E. The Need for a New Partial Takings Approach
If offsetting is constitutional—as this Note argues422—and largely a
product of the nineteenth century—a different era with a different legal
system—offsetting should be rejected because public policy concerns of the
twenty-first century public are different.
Seas are rising,423 and
municipalities, states, and the federal government’s options are limited.424
One way to make implementing solutions easier is to ensure that federal
and state partial condemnation law is fair to all parties involved.425
Ultimately, fairness requires that courts render compensation that is just
to the landowner and the public.426 If a landowner’s property sits directly
on the coastline, is it just that his compensation is reduced, when the
evidence shows that a sand dune project would save his home from certain
destruction? One thing that is certain, whatever benefit the dune project has
on the property, is that the landowner will capture the value of that
414. See supra note 365.
415. See supra notes 6, 328 and accompanying text (discussing the confusion created by
the distinction between general and special benefits).
416. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Gatson, 617 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981).
417. See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 329–30, 350–51 (discussing the inconsistency courts generated in
determining whether benefits were general or special).
419. See supra notes 91–98 and accompanying text (citing cases).
420. See supra note 354 and accompanying text (discussing the New Jersey’s Supreme
Court’s opinion that the special/general benefit dichotomy did little to illuminate any
principles).
421. See supra note 338 and accompanying text (arguing that compensation must be just
to the landowner and the public).
422. See supra Part IV.A–B.
423. See supra notes 138–49 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 143–46 and accompanying text.
425. See supra notes 160, 313, 337–38 and accompanying text (discussing the need for
fairness in partial takings cases).
426. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
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enhanced benefit when the property is sold.427 In a circumstance where a
landowner benefits from a project, as shown by the evidence, not permitting
that benefit to offset a condemnation award acts as a subsidy to that
particular landowner, which is paid by the rest of the community.428
Instead, permitting all nonspeculative benefits to offset a partial
condemnation award is fair to the landowners because they receive the
benefits while living on the property, which they can sell in the future.429
Under this rule, the other members of the community do not wholly
subsidize the project, but instead pay their fair share in taxes,430 and the
community members are not prevented from receiving the projections of the
project because of a few holdouts.431
CONCLUSION
Developed in the nineteenth century, the traditional approach to
offsetting in partial takings cases reflects nineteenth-century concerns and
uses nineteenth-century valuation methods. The special/general benefits
dichotomy has paralyzed courts and litigants generating inconsistent
opinion after inconsistent opinion. Yet, the majority of state and the federal
courts appear to continue to revere the doctrine as though it were laid out in
the Bill of Rights.
It is time for the courts to recognize that this judicially created distinction
only serves to layer unneeded complexity on an already difficult question of
just compensation. Courts should reject this faux sophistication and follow
a simplified rule that all reasonably certain benefits can offset a
condemnation award in a partial takings case.

427. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
428. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
430. See supra notes 103–08 and accompanying text (discussing taxpayers right to
receive public benefits).
431. See supra notes 362–67 and accompanying text (discussing the holdout problem in
eminent domain, and specifically only the New Jersey coastline).

